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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID R. TSCHAGGENY and l 
ELLEN CHARLENE PRICE 
TSCHAGGENY, his wife, I 
Plantiffs and Appellants, I 
- vs. - \ No. 14487 
UNION PACIFIC LAND RE- ( 
SOURCES CORPORATION and 1 
FRED F. SANDERS, I 
Defendants and Respondents. I 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to establish an easement or way of 
necessity over certain properties in Weber County, State 
of Utah in which there was a unity of title at one time, 
the property having been the road bed of the Utah Idaho 
Central Railroad. The plaintiffs are the successors in 
interest of a certain tract of land, the subject of this 
action, which was bounded to the South and to a public 
way over property owned by the defendant Union Pacific 
Land Resources Corporation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1948, S. J. Quinney, as trustee, conveyed the 
property to William M. Howell, and William M. Howell 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in turn conveyed the property to Charles W. Price (Tr. 
196 line 24). Price occupied and used the land until 
1967 when he sold part of the property back to the 
Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation and retained 
the balance, the subject of this action, until April of 
1975 when it was conveyed to the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs used the property and in order to 
reach the same, crossed over the property of the defend-
ant until sometime in 1975, when the defendant Union 
Pacific Land Resources Corporation, acting through its 
lessee the defendant Fred F. Saunders, placed a gate 
across the roadway and placed a lock on said gate, lock-
ing them out. Although the period of time in which the 
plaintiffs and their predecessors crossed over the defend-
ants' land in order to reach his property was a little 
less than the 20 year period to establish a prescriptive 
right, it is the plaintiffs' contention that a way of neces-
sity had been established and that the roadway should 
be Ordered open and plaintiffs granted the use to cross 
defendants' property in order to go in and out of their 
own property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a hearing the Court took the matter under ad-
visement, and on the 24th day of December 1975, ren-
dered a memorandum decision in substance as follows: 
"The Court finds that the plaintiffs and their 
predecessors in title have not used the souther-
most strip of land over which the right-of-way is 
claimed for the requisite 20 years under Utah law 
in order to establish a prescriptive right. 
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"The fact that no prescriptive right exists 
makes the question of an easement of necessity a 
moot question. This is because an easement of 
necessity is simply an easement implied in law to 
reserve access to a property retained by a grantor 
on the assumption that the grantor would not have 
conveyed without reserving a right-of-way. Here 
there was nothing in the nature of a right to be 
reserved. The essential ingredient to a way of 
necessity is that the grantor had access to either 
(1) a public way or (2) other property which he 
owned or had rights in. Neither exists in this case. 
"The plaintiffs' Complaint is, therefore, dis-
missed, no cause of action. 
"Dated and signed this 24 day of December, 
1975. 
"BY THE COURT 
Calvin Gould, Judge" 
Later, after arguing a motion for new trial, the Court 
reaffirmed its original decision and from this ruling dis-
missing plaintiffs' Complaint the plaintiffs appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A WAY OF NECESSITY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED 
AND THE ROADWAY SHOULD BE OPENED AND 
PLAINTIFFS GRANTED THE USE OF THE RIGHT 
OF WAY OVER DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY IN 
ORDER TO REACH THEIR GROUND. 
All of the testimony would indicate that there was 
no other access to the road which had been in continu-
ous use ever since the Utah Idaho Central Railroad sold 
the property and removed the tracks therefrom. See Tr. 
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182 Lines 12-26; 182 Lines 12-26; 183 Lines 1 to 17 
and 184 Lines 7-19. 
There was an attempt on part of defendants' counsel 
to show a road and access to the plaintiffs' property from 
the East. However there was no such road from the piece 
known as Stone's and the testimony was that both Stone's 
roadway was never used, except as to access to Stone's 
field and to the property of the plaintiffs there existed 
a swamp and other indications that no road had ever 
been established along that line. See Tr. 190 L. 27-30; 
191 L. y-16; See also Tr. 181 L. 25-30; 182 L. 1-30 and 
183 L. 1-30. 
It therefore is apparent from the record that coun-
sel's attempt to show that there was no other means of 
egress and ingress to the East of plaintiffs' property rather 
than the one, the subject of this action, is entirely with-
out merit. 
In the case of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 
P.2d 117, Justice Pratt stated: 
"The theory upon which a way of necessity 
is based is that all the property is once owned by 
a single person. He divides it into two tracts and 
conveys away one tract. The physical location of 
the other tract is such that it is not reasonably 
accessible without crossing the tract conveyed 
away. If the grantor retains the tract which is 
thus surrounded, without any mention of a way, 
it is presumed that he intended to reserve a right-
of-way to and from the tract retained. If he sells 
the tract which is thus surrounded without men-
tion of a means of ingress and egress it is pre-
sumed that he intended to create a servient estate 
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in himself to the extent of a right of way in favor 
of the other tract of land. The requirements for 
a way of necessity are set out in the case of Morris 
V. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P.1127, 1132, as 
follows : 
" '(1) Unity of title followed by severance; 
" ' (2 ) That at the time of the severance 
the servitude was apparently obvious and vis-
ible; See (Exhs. P, A, B, C, D, E, and F.) 
" '(3) That the easement must be reason-
ably necessary to the enjoyment of the domi-
nant estate; and 
" ' ( 4 ) It must usually be continuous and 
self acting, as distinguished from one used 
only from time to time when occasion arises.' 
(See Exs. A-E) (Tr. 191 L. 2-29) 
"'See Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 
52, 185 P.2d 264; citing Morris V. Blunt, and 
reaffirming requirement number three above, 
and discussing generally the doctrine of ease-
ments by implication, and reasonable necessity; 
Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 189 P.2d 701, 
Fayter v. North, 30 Utah 156, 18 P. 742, 6 
L.R.A., N.S. 410. 
"It is apparent then, from an analysis of the 
above requirements that the doctrine has its basis 
in the theory of a grant by reason of circumstances 
attendant at the time of the grant. It is incon-
sistent with the adversity contemplated in the 
theory of an easement based upon prescription. 
"A way of necessity arises from the existence 
of such necessity at the time of the dividing of 
the property. A right of way by prescription can 
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only be obtained by satisfying certain other re-
quirements. These requirements may, for all prac-
tical purposes, be included within the three set 
out below though the cases under particular fact 
situations have emphasized other subdivisions. The 
three uses are: (1) Continuous; (2) Open; and 
(3) Adverse under a claim of right. See Jensen v. 
Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070; Dahl v. 
Roach, 76 Utah 74, 287 P. 633; Bowers v. Gilbert, 
63 Utah 245, 224 P. 881; Morris v. Blunt, supra; 
Colton v. Murphy, 41 Utah 591, 127 P. 335; Lund 
v. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33. For a recent 
discussion of the elements necessary to attain a 
prescriptive right, and the confusion that has 
existed on this matter in the past, see Zollinger v. 
Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714, 170 A.L.R. 
770." 
In the case of Hancock v. Henderson, 236 Md. 98, 
202 A.2d 499, 9 ALR 3rd, 592, the Court stated: 
"We have said the doctrine of easements by 
necessity is based upon a public policy favoring 
full utilization of land and a presumption the 
parties do not intend the land conveyed be ren-
dered unfit for occupancy. Condry v. Laurie, 184 
Md 317, 321, 41 A.2d 66. In 3 Tiffany Real Prop-
etry, (3d ed.). Section 793, pages 296, the writer 
states that decisions are not in harmony where 
the property borders on navigable water. The cases 
seem to be searching for the intent of the parties, 
but some hold that where none is expressed it will 
be presumed the parties intended any lawful use 
of the property. 
"As in Condry v. Laurie, supra, we are dealing 
with the rights and obligations of subsequent title 
holders of both the alleged dominant and servient 
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properties. The Hendersons, as remote grantees, 
cannot create the way of necessity. If the way of 
necessity was not implied at the time of the grant 
in 1898 it cannot be established by a subsequent 
necessity. Feldstein v. Segall, 198 Md 285, 294, 
81 A2d 610; 28 CJS Easements #35 b. In other 
words, the necessity must be determined from the 
conditions as they existed at the time of the con-
veyance. In the first Condry v. Laurie case we 
held that a personal license in the deed did not 
negate a way of necessity, but the occasion for 
using the way was deferred until expiration of the 
license, the necessity having been in existence at 
the time of the grant. The theory is that such an 
easement, being appurtenant, passes with each 
conveyance to subsequent grantees. Douglass v. 
Riggin, 123 Md 18, 23, 90 A. 1000. Hence a re-
mote grantee of land not being used at the time 
of severance may nevertheless, when the use be-
comes necessary to the enjoyment of his property, 
claim the easement under his remote deed. See 
Finn v. William, 376, 111 95, 33 NE2d 226, 133 
ALR 1390, which is the subject of an annotation 
in 133 ALR 1393 on the effect of non-use of a 
way of necessity. This rule is consonant with the 
generally held view that non-use alone is not suf-
ficient to extni^uish a way by necessity. Knotts v. 
Summit Park Co., 146 Md 234, 126 A 280. * * * 
"We now turn briefly to the question of loca-
tion of the right of way. While the way by neces-
sity did exist at the time Little Woods was con-
veyed away, there was no proof in the case that its 
location was established at that time. There was 
testimony of course that a road existed in 1911 
for a brief span of time utilized for a limited 
purpose, and as noted previously soon thereafter 
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it fell into disuse until the appellees recently began 
to improve it. We do not think this slight activity 
so long ago was sufficient to establish with exacti-
tude the location of an easement claimed now by 
a remote grantee of the dominant tract. It appears 
that the roadbed claimed is not inconveniently 
located on the servient land which is now being 
farmed. While there is some dispute, counsel for 
the appellants claimed it nearly bisects the farm. 
The uses now being made of both parcels of land 
have materially changed since 1911. While there 
is no question that the appellees have a way by 
necessity over the land of the appellants, we are 
of the opinion that the equitable disposition of 
the case calls for us to remand it to the lower 
court for a determination of a location of the road 
which will be fair to both sides. * * *" 
POINT II. 
UNITY OF TITLE FOLLOWED BY SEVERANCE. 
In the present case, there was no doubt there had 
been a unity of title. The Court certainly can take judi-
cial notice of the fact that the Utah Idaho Central Rail-
road had owned the entire tract where it laid its tracks 
and that the entire tract constituted the roadbed of this 
railroad. Subsequently the property was sold off in sec-
tions with the plaintiffs being the ultimate owners, and 
from the exhibits as herein set forth, the only access to 
the property was over the land of the defendant and while 
the use has not existed for the past 20 years, it certainly 
was the intention of the parties to reserve to the plain-
tiffs and their predecessors in interest the right-of-way 
over the property as a means of ingress and egress. 
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In the case of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 
P.2d 117, Justice Pratt stated: 
"The theory upon which a way of necessity 
is based is that all the property is once owned 
by a single person. He divides it into two tracts 
and conveys away one tract. The physical location 
of the other tract is such that it is not reasonably 
accessible without crossing the tract conveyed 
away. If the grantor retains the tract which is 
thus surrounded, without any mention of a way, 
it is presumed that he intended to reserve a right 
of way to and from the tract retained. If he sells 
the tract which is thus surrounded without men-
tion of a means of ingress and egress it is pre-
sumed that he intended to create a servient estate 
in himself to the extent of a right of way in 
favor of the other tract of land. The requirements 
for a way of necessity are set out in the case of 
Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127, 1132, 
as follows: 
" '(1) Unity of title followed by severance; 
" ' (2 ) That at the time of the severance 
the servitude was apparently obvious and vis-
ible; (See Exs. P, A, B, C, D, E and F) 
"
 c(3) That the easement must be reason-
ably necessary to the enjoyment of the domi-
nant estate; and 
" ' ( 4 ) It must usually be continuous and 
self-acting, as distinguished from one used 
only from time to time when occasion arises.' " 
(See Exhs. A to E) (Tr. 181 L. 2 to 29) 
In 19 C.J. ff 155-156, it was recited: 
"An owner of land cannot have an easement 
in his own estate in fee, for the plain and obvious 
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reason that he has an unlimited right to use the 
land in any manner he chooses, and all subordi-
nate and inferior derivative rights are necessarily 
merged and lost in the higher right. * * * and the 
right of way is extinguished * * * *. 
"However an exception to the general rule 
arises in the case of a way of necessity. Where 
there is a unity of ownership a previous right of 
way which came into existence by necessity is 
merely in suspension and not extinguished.55 
Again in 19 C.J. 947, Sec. 161, it recites: 
"Ordinarily after a merger by the unity of title 
to the dominant and servient estates the owner 
grants the former dominant estate to another, it 
passes without the former incidents unless they are 
revived by force of the grant itself, by such words 
of description as could bring them into being by 
way of a new grant; and conversely if he conveys 
the servient tenement there is no revival of the 
easement unless there is an express reservation in 
his favor. But although the old easement is not 
revived by the severance, yet a new easement may 
be granted by implication, if it is apparent, con-
tinuous, and necessary, upon the same principle 
and under the same circumstances that easements 
are granted by implication upon the severance of 
an estate originally entire.55 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS AN IMPLIED EASEMENT OF NECES-
SITY WHICH AROSE BY IMPLICATION. 
In Hellberg v. Coffin Sheep Co., 404 P.2d 770, 66 
Wash.2d 664 (1965), the Court stated: 
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"Implied easements appurtenant to land and 
easements of necessity arise by implication." 
"An 'easement of necessity' is an expression 
of public policy that will not permit property to 
be landlocked and rendered useless, and in further-
ance of that policy the owner, or one entitled to 
beneficial use of landlocked property has right 
to condemn private way of necessity for ingress 
and egress. RCWA 8.24-010.-Id." 
Again in 25 Am. Jur.2d 447, Sec. 34 Way of Necessity 
are generally described : 
"A way of necessity is an easement founded 
on an implied reservation. It arises where there 
is a conveyance of a part of a tract of land of 
such nature and extent that either the part con-
veyed or the part retained is shut off from access 
to a road to the outer world by the land from 
which it is severad or by this land and the land of 
strangers. In such a situation there is an implied 
grant of a way across the grantor's remaining land 
across the portion of the land conveyed. The order 
in which two parcels of land are conveyed makes 
no difference in determining whether there is a 
right of way by necessity appurtenant to either. 
"A way of necessity results from the applica-
tion of the presumption that whenever a party 
conveys property he conveys whatever is neces-
sary for the beneficial use of the land he still pos-
sesses. Such a way is of common-law origin, and 
is presumed to have been intended by the parties. 
A way of necessity is also said to be supported by 
the rule of public policy that lands should not be 
rendered unfit for occupancy or successful culti-
vation. Whether a grant or reservation of a way 
of necessity should be implied, however, depends 
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on the terms of the conveyance and the facts of 
the particular use. The implication will not be 
made where it is shown that the parties did not 
intend it. Nor will an implied easement of neces-
sity be judicially recognized where it is precluded 
by statute. 
"Questions in respect of the permanency, ap-
parency, and continuity of servitude, which are 
of importance in connection with easements im-
plied on severance of property from the fact that 
a use had been imposed on one part of the prop-
ertly for the benefit of another part, are not 
applicable to typical ways of necessity. There is a 
definite distinction between such an easement and 
a way of necessity, mainly because a way of neces-
sity does not rest on a pre-existing use but on the 
need for a way across the granted or reserved 
premises." 
See Restatement of the Law, Sec. 476, which states 
on page 2978: 
"An easement created by implication arises as 
an inference of the intention of the parties to a 
conveyance of land. The inference is drawn from 
the circumstances under which the conveyance 
was made rather than from the language of the 
conveyance. To draw an inference of intention 
from such circumstances, they must be or must 
be assumed to be within the knowledge of the 
parties. The inference drawn represents an at-
tempt to ascribe an intention to parties who had 
not thought or had not bothered to put the inten-
ion into words, or perhaps more often, to parties 
who actually had formed no intention conscious 
to themselves. In the latter aspect the implication 
approaches in fact, if not in theory, crediting 
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the parties with intention which they did not have, 
but which they probably would have had had 
they actually foreseen what they might have fore-
seen from information available at the time of 
the conveyance * * *." 
In Choumos v. Alkema, 27 Utah 2d 244, 494 P.2d 
950, Chief Justice Callister said at pages 274-8 as follows: 
"The evidence indicates that defendants and 
their predecessor in interest, Shelby, have had 
ownership and possession of this tract since 1943. 
Such circumstances negative the superior right 
to possession which plaintiff must prove to pre-
vail in the instant action. 
"The trial court further determined that de-
fendants had an easement across plaintiff's prop-
erty in Section 29 to their tract located therein. 
The trial court found two alternative grounds 
upon which to support its determination, first, an 
easement by implication, second, a prescriptive 
easement. 
"The trial court found that in 1943 when 
Shelby acquired the tract from Fraziers, there was 
no other access to the strip; the road across Fraz-
iers5 property was apparent, obvious, and visible; 
Shelby used the road for access to the strip where 
he held and watered his cattle. The trial court 
further found that upon severance of the strip 
by Fraziers5 conveyance to Shelby in 1943 with 
Fraziers5 retaining the balance of their holdings 
in the southwest quarter of Section 29, there was 
created an easement by implication with respect 
to the use of the road in favor of the tract severed. 
Such easement was appurtenant thereto, and de-
fendants acquired their rights to the easement at 
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the time Shelby conveyed the parcel by warranty 
deed to them. 
"The findings of the trial court comport with 
the requirements set forth to establish an ease-
ment by implication, namely, (1) unity of title 
followed by severance; (2) at the time of sever-
ance the servitude was apparent, obvious and vis-
ible; (3) the easement was reasonably necessary 
to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and (4) 
the use of the easement must be continuous as 
distinguished from one use from time to time when 
the occasion arises." 
It is also to be noted that the Warranty Deeds to 
the two pieces of land made by Mr. Price recited subject 
to existing easements and rights of way "of record." 
According to the testimony of defendant's own witness 
these documents were prepared by the legal department 
of the Union Pacific Railroad, and without any profes-
sional help to Mr. and Mrs. Price. (Tr. 237, Lines 23-30) 
On February 24, 1948, a Receivers Deed was made 
from S. Q. Quinney, Receiver for the Utah-Idaho Cen-
tral Railroad to William Howell to part of the roadbed 
of the Utah Idaho Central Railroad. Part of this property 
was in turn conveyed by William Howell and his wife 
to Charles W. Price and Ellen B. Price. Plaintiffs certainly 
intended a right of way and were mislead by defend-
ants adding "of record." 
On May 13, 1967, Price and his wife conveyed part 
of this land to the Union Pacific Railroad, "subject to 
existing easements and rights of way of record." 
It is true that on that same date the exhibits will 
show a conveyance was made by quit claim deed of a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
tract including several fragments and segments in this 
same area. No reservation of the easements and rights 
of way was made in this separate quit claim deed, but 
as the Court recited from the bench, that inasmuch as 
both instruments were dated the same date the Court 
should consider them as one instrument. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff, therefore, respectfully submits that all of 
the necessary elements exist in the instant case and that 
it was the intention of the parties to create a way of 
necessity. 
There was a unity of title as testified to by the De-
fendants' own witness. The entire tract, including the 
piece owned by the plaintiff and the tract now owned 
by the defendant constituted the roadbed of the old 
Utah-Idaho Central Railroad; that when it was divided, 
title was conveyed to William Howell, who in turn con-
veyed to Charles W. Price and his wife, Ellen B. Price, 
who in turn conveyed to the plaintiff. 
In Wagner v. Fairlamb, 379 P.2d 165, 151 Colo 481 
(1963), the Court said: 
"The three requirements to be met, generally 
before way of necessity exists are original owner-
ship of entire tract by single grantor prior to 
division, necessity existing at the time of sever-
ance, and great necessity for the particular right-
of-way. 
"That there was property which was involved 
in location of right-of-way of necessity in favor of 
southern tract over northern tract and which be-
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longed to third person, whose rights had not been 
determined did not preclude existence of ease-
ment, -id." 
It is to be noted in all of these conveyances, including 
the Warranty Deeds, of which the defendant has made 
so much claim, recited "subject to existing easements 
and rights of way of record.55 The Court can certainly 
disregard defendant's attempt to establish any other 
means of egress and ingress to the property, inasmuch as 
the attempts, including the pictures, certainly failed as 
to proof and at the present state of recording, plaintiff's 
property is landlocked and therefore becomes useless. 
This, we submit is contrary to public policy and most 
certainly was not the intention of the parties at the time 
of the making of the conveyance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LA MAR DUNCAN 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
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